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Abstract
This paper studies what induces governments to undertake reforms
aimed at …nancial development. Its starting point is Abiad and Mody
(AER 95(1), 2005). Rather than their ordered logit technique, it uses a
within groups approach allowing for error dependence across countries
and over time. This paper …nds that policy change in a country is
negatively rather than positively associated with its liberalization level,
while the regional liberalization gap does not appear relevant. On the
e¤ects of shocks and crises, it suggests that some of the Abiad and
Mody (2005) …ndings are robust, but others are fragile. Furthermore,
it claims that the extent of democracy is important for this analysis,
and identi…es a negative e¤ect of the extent of democracy on policy
reform.
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11 Introduction
Financial liberalization has been one of the key trends characterizing the
post-Bretton Woods era, with decreasing capital controls and an increasing
participation of developing countries in international …nancial markets in
recent decades. More broadly, domestic …nancial development, measured in
terms of liquid liabilities or stock market capitalization, has risen dramati-
cally in recent decades. By using Bayesian Model Averaging and General-
to-speci…c approaches, Huang (2005a) examines the long-run determinants
of …nanical development. However, what are the factors directly stimulating
governments to liberalize the …nancial sector, aimed at enhancing …nancial
development? Building on the framework of Abiad and Mody (2005), this
paper attempts to answer this question, and to provide a more comprehen-
sive view of the political economy of …nancial reform.
Although …nancial liberalization has been criticized as increasing the
likelihood of …nancial crises and …nancial fragility, …nancial liberalization is
widely regarded as promoting the ‡ow of …nancial resources, thereby reduc-
ing capital costs, stimulating investment and fostering …nancial development
and economic growth (McKinnon 1973, Shaw 1973, Demirgüç-Kunt and De-
tragiache 1998, Summers 2000). In practice, governments in recent decades
have been committed to reducing direct intervention in the …nancial system
by easing or removing controls over interest rates, credit allocations and …-
nancial transactions domestically and internationally, opening up the bank-
ing system for foreign entry, and privatizing commercial banks or non-bank
…nancial intermediaries. What are the main factors inducing governments
to take these steps?
Abiad and Mody (2005) introduce a framework that rigorously examines
the combined e¤ects on policy change of domestic learning, regional di¤u-
sion, shocks, crises, ideology, and economic and political structure. Using
an ordered logit technique to estimate their speci…cations, Abiad and Mody
(2005) argue that policy change in a country is positively related to its level
of liberalization and any liberalization gap from the regional leader. The
pace of reform is found to be a¤ected by shocks or discrete changes such as
a balance-of-payment crisis, a banking crisis, a new government’s …rst year
2in o¢ce, participation in an IMF program and a decline in US interest rates.
However, they …nd that ideology and political and economic structures have
“limited in‡uence” on the likelihood of reform.
The Abiad and Mody (2005) analytical framework is attractive in many
respects, but some aspects of their empirical analysis may merit further
attention. The ordered logit technique they use is not necessarily natural
in this context given the nature of the dependent variable, as the change
in the extent of …nancial liberalization. Moreover, their analysis does not
take into account the e¤ects of common trends and the possibility of error
dependence across countries and over time, which seems especially relevant
when the e¤ects of domestic learning and regional di¤usion are studied.
Based on their work, this analysis introduces four innovations. Firstly,
rather than using their ordered logit technique, this analysis uses a within
groups approach to estimating the models, adapted to allow for cross sec-
tion error dependence. Second, panel-robust standard errors are reported to
account for error dependence over time. Third, it adds the extent of democ-
racy into the Abiad and Mody (2005) framework. The level of democracy
is a potentially important variable that re‡ects the political environment in
which new policies are approved or rejected, and policy changes take place.
Fourth, in addition to focusing on the original dataset used by Abiad and
Mody (2005), it takes up a further investigation based on a larger set of
countries, in which the Abiad and Mody …nancial liberalization index is
replaced by the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness (2005).
The paper produces the following …ndings. In general it con…rms the
negative e¤ects of banking crises and high in‡ation on policy change, as
observed by Abiad and Mody (2005). It is also consistent with Abiad and
Mody (2005) in suggesting that the e¤ects of new governments in their
…rst year and IMF programs are strong when …nancial sectors are highly
repressed, and become weaker as the level of …nancial liberalization goes up.
However, this paper points to the following three distinct conclusions. First,
it shows that some of their …ndings on the e¤ects of crises and shocks are
fragile. Second, it is at odds with Abiad and Mody (2005) on the e¤ects of
domestic learning and regional di¤usion. It suggests that policy change in a
country is negatively rather than positively related to its liberalization level,
3and the liberalization gap from the regional leader appears less relevant than
in the Abiad and Mody (2005). Third, this analysis observes a signi…cant
e¤ect of the extent of democracy, the new variable added to the Abiad and
Mody framework, on policy change. The …ndings on the negative e¤ects of
domestic learning and irrelevance of regional di¤usion are supported by a
larger sample of countries drawing on the Chinn-Ito index of capital account
openness.
The following section provides a brief discussion of the model speci…ca-
tions and econometric methods. Section 3 presents the empirical results,
based on the original dataset with the Abiad and Mody measure, and a
larger set of countries with the Chinn-Ito measure, separately. Section 4
summarizes the conclusions.
2 Methodology
This section starts by brie‡y describing the models used in Abiad and Mody
(2005) to study how …nancial reform is shaped, followed by a discussion of
the econometric methods that will be applied in this paper.
2.1 Model speci…cations
Below is the general model structure that captures the e¤ects of domestic















The dependent variable, ¢FLit, is used to measure the policy change,
the di¤erence between the level of …nancial liberalization in next period,
4FLit, and the current level of …nancial liberalization, FLi;t¡1. FLit ranges
between 0 and 1, with 0 and 1 corresponding to complete …nancial repression
and complete …nancial liberalization, respectively. FL¤
it is the desired level
of …nancial liberalization. The adjustment factor, ﬁ, measures the degree
of status quo bias. A lower value of ﬁ is associated with more resistance
to reform and a greater bias towards the status quo. The …rst term on
the RHS is therefore used to examine domestic adjustment. The second
term captures regional di¤usion in which REG_FLi;t¡1 is the maximum
level of …nancial liberalization achieved in the region. SHOCKSit denotes
discrete changes including four types of crises, including balance-of-payment
crises (BOPit), banking crises (BANKit), recessions (RECESSIONit) and
high in‡ation periods (HINFLit), and three types of internal or external
in‡uences like the incumbent’s …rst year in o¢ce (FIRSTYEARit), the
in‡uence of international …nancial institutions re‡ected by a dummy for an
IMF program of lending (IMFit) and the in‡uence of global factors proxied
by the US Treasury Bill rate (USINTit). IDEOLOGYit re‡ects political
orientation including a dummy for left-wing government (LEFTit) and a
dummy for right-wing government (RIGHTit). STRUCTUREit represents
structural variables (either economic or political), for example the trade
openness measure (OPENit) used in Abiad and Mody (2005).
Overall, the Abiad and Mody framework is appealing, covering almost
all possible aspects. However, a political structural variable, the extent of
democracy (DEMOit), may be relevant to the analysis and is added to their
framework. It is the Polity indicator “polity2” in the PolityIV Database
(Marshall et al. 2003) and seeks to measure institutional quality based on
the freedom of su¤rage, operational constraints and balances on executives,
and respect for other basic political rights and civil liberties. It is called the
“combinedpolity score”, de…nedas the democracy score minus the autocracy
score1.
1The democracy and autocracy scores are derived from six authority characteristics
(regulation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment; operational indepen-
dence of chief executive or executive constraints; and regulation and competition of par-
ticipation). Based on these criteria, each country is assigned a democracy score and an
autocracy score ranging from 0 to 10. The larger is the democracy score, the fairer is
the election of executive power, the more open is the political process and the higher the
52.1.1 Benchmark speci…cation
The benchmark speci…cation assumes that the desired level of …nancial lib-
eralisation, FL¤
it, is the perfect level of …nancial liberalization and the ad-
justment factor, ﬁ, is positively related to the level of …nancial liberalization
to allow for the likelihood of domestic learning. Putting FL¤ = 1 and
ﬁ = ￿1FLi;t¡1(￿1 > 0) into Equation (1) above and reparameterizing, we
have












This equation is Equation (4) in Abiad and Mody (2005).
2.1.2 Alternative speci…cations
Relaxing two assumptions used in the benchmark speci…cation, three alter-
native speci…cations are considered:
First, rather than assuming the desired level of …nancial liberalization,
FL¤
it, to be full liberalization, it is natural to adopt country-speci…c measures
of the desired extent of liberalization. When plugging FL¤ = c (0 < c < 1)
and ﬁ = ￿1FLi;t¡1 into Equation (1) above, rede…ning the coe¢cients yields
the following equation as in Equation (5) of Abiad and Mody (2005)2:
extent of the constraints on executive power. On the contrary, a larger autocracy score
re‡ects a less open political process in a country in terms of less competitiveness and
fairness in elections, narrower participation and fewer constraints on the executive.



























Second, the desired level of …nancial liberalization, FL¤
it, might be rea-
sonably regarded to be increasing in the level of income. When FL¤ =
a + bYit and ﬁ = ￿1FLi;t¡1 are considered, Equation (1) above can be re-
arranged and reparameterized as Equation (6) in Abiad and Mody (2005)3:














Finally, whenthe possibility that shocks, ideology andstructure variables
may exert e¤ects on the status quo bias is taken into account, the previous
assumption ﬁ = ￿1FLi;t¡1 is replaced by the following equation:

























Putting this expression as well as FL¤ = c into Equation (1) and re-
de…ning the coe¢cients yields the third speci…cation, Equation (8) in Abiad
and Mody (2005), below:





















Abiad and Mody (2005) use an ordered logit technique to estimate the
benchmark speci…cation and three alternative speci…cations with results pre-
sented in Tables 7, 8 and 9 of their paper, respectively. A minor problem has
been detected in their empirical results in which Singapore is misclassi…ed as
an African country while South Africa is misclassi…ed as an East Asian coun-
try. The corrected results are presented in Appendix Table 4. In general, the
pattern of Appendix Table 4A is similar to that of their Table 7. Appendix
Table 4B presents more evidence for IMFit and REG_FLi;t¡1 ¡FLi;t¡1
4.
4More speci…cally, IMFit has been found to be signi…cant when country …xed e¤ects
are excluded, while REG_FLi;t¡1 ¡FLi;t¡1 appears to be signi…cant no matter whether
the country …xed e¤ects are included.
8It is worth noting that Appendix Table 4C shows that FLi;t¡1, OPENit and
OPENit£ FLi;t¡1 appear to be insigni…cant when country …xed e¤ects are
included, di¤erent from the Table 9 of Abiad and Mody (2005), which shows
these variables to be signi…cant when country …xed e¤ects are included.
More importantly, the analyses conducted by Abiad and Mody (2005)
may be questioned in the following two aspects:
The …rst is that the ordered logit technique they apply may not be
natural for this context, although the discrete and ordinal nature of the …-
nanical liberalization level, FLi;t, and policy change, ¢FLi;t, may render
the ordered logit method an appropriate choice at …rst glance. Since the de-
pendent variable is not the level of …nanical liberalization, but policy change,
…nancial liberalization moving from score 1 to 3 in terms of their original
measure5 is treated the same as moving from score 16 to 18 for example.
However, given the ordinal feature of their original measure, in reality policy
change re‡ected by moving from score 1 to 3, which could be at rather low
levels, doesn’t necessarily lead to the same extent of …nancial liberalization
as moving from score 16 to score 18, which could be at much higher levels of
…nancial liberalization. Given this particular nature of the dependent vari-
able, resorting to the ordered logit technique may not lead to the expected
gains.
Second, like most cross country research, Abiad and Mody (2005) do not
take into account the e¤ects of common trends and the possibility of error
dependence across countries and over time. This seems especially relevant
when the e¤ects of domestic learning and regional di¤usion are investigated.
The assumption on the error term they use implies that the disturbances
are uncorrelated between groups and over time. However, if the error term
contains one or more unobserved factors which have the same (or di¤erent)
e¤ects on every unit, as noted by Phillips and Sul (2003) among others, “the
consequences of ignoring cross section dependence can be serious”. On the
other hand, the consequences of ignoring serial correlation and heteroskedas-
ticity can also be serious, since this may lead to a downward bias in standard
errors, and therefore higher signi…cance levels attached to the coe¢cients. In
5Divided by 18, the original measure has been rescaled to get an index, FLi;t, ranging
between 0 and 1.
9examining the origins of …nancial openness, Quinn and Inclan (1997) argue
that it is critical to consider a common trend, such as changes in consumer
tastes and technology, that may exert substantial e¤ects on government lib-
eralization policies as “fundamental but unobservable forces”.
The particular nature of the dependent variable and the possibility of
error dependence suggest that another estimation approach would be worth-
while. The wide range of the original …nancial liberalization index from score
1 to 18 and the policy change, ¢FLi;t; from -1 to 1 (after transformation)
makes a simpler linear regression method a possible choice for this context.
This paper’s approach centers on the Pesaran (2006a) common correlated
e¤ect pooled (CCEP) estimator, a generalization of the …xed e¤ects esti-
mator that allows for the possibility of cross section correlation. To adjust
for serial correlation in individual errors6, the panel-robust standard errors
due to Arellano (1987) are computed for the CCEP estimates, allowing the
errors not only to be serially correlated for a given country, but also to have
variances and covariances that vary across countries.
Pesaran(2006a) proposes two common correlatede¤ect (CCE) approaches
for large heterogeneous panels whose error contains unobserved common
factors. More speci…cally, this approach augments the one-way …xed e¤ects
model with the (weighted) cross sectional means of the dependent variable
and the individual speci…c regressors, analogous to a two-way …xed e¤ects
model. Including the (weighted) cross sectional averages of the dependent
variable and individual speci…c regressors is suggested by Pesaran (2006a,
2006b) as an e¤ective way to …lter out the impacts of common factors, which
could be common technological shocks or macroeconomic shocks, causing
between group error dependence.
The Pesaran (2006a, 2006b) approach exhibits considerable advantages.
It allows unobserved common factors to be possibly correlated with exoge-
nous regressors and exert di¤erential impacts on individual units. It permits
unit root processes amongst the observed and unobserved common e¤ects.
The proposed estimator is still consistent, although it is no longer e¢cient,
6Although serial correlation in the errors can be alleviated once country …xed e¤ects
are included, it may not be fully removed. The standard robust standard errors do not
allow for serial correlation in errors, but only for heteroskedasticity.
10when the idiosyncratic components are not serially uncorrelated.
In this context, the cross section means7 of ¢FLit, GDPi;t and OPENi;t
are considered since these variables, continuous variables (not dummy vari-
ables), are more inclined to pick up the common e¤ects. To allow the e¤ects
to be heterogeneous across countries, the models are augmented with the
interactions between country dummies and means of the above variables as
well as time dummies. The CCEP estimator has been shown to be asymp-
totically unbiased and consistent as N -> 1 for both T …xed or T -> 1,
and to have generally satisfactory …nite sample properties.
Appendix Table 3 presents the time series properties for three continu-
ous variables, the …nancial liberalization index (FLi;t), GDP per capita in
PPP terms (GDPi;t) and trade openness (OPENi;t). It contrasts a panel
unit root test proposed by Pesaran (2006b) in the presence of cross section
dependence with the Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test, which is associ-
ated with the assumption of cross section indenpendence of the error term
and does not require a balanced panel. Pesaran (2006b) approach augments
the standard ADF regression with cross section averages of lagged levels and
…rst-di¤erences of individual series, to control for cross section dependence,
the Maddala and Wu (1999) Fisher test is then applied to this more general
setting. With cross sectionally independent errors, and the Maddala and
Wu (1999) Fisher test cannot reject the null of nonstationarity for FLi;t,
GDPi;t and OPENi;t when we do not allow for a trend. With a trend, the
series of GDPi;t and OPENi;t are close to being found as stationary. When
we allow for a trend, Pesaran’s test shows that we can reject the null of
nonstationarity for FLi;t, GDPi;t and OPENi;t at signi…cance level close
to 10%8, suggesting that FLi;t, GDPi;t and OPENi;t may not be I(1) vari-
ables. However, this result should be interpreted with caution since there
are reservations as to the power and reliability of these tests.
7In principal the weights used do not a¤ect the asymptotic distribution of the esti-
mators. The equal weights are used here as suggested for the CCEP estimator (Pesaran,
2006a).
8The test statistic takes the form of ¡2
N P
i=1
ln(piT) in which piT is the p-value cor-
responding to the unit root test of the i
th individual cross section unit for the cross
sectionally augmented DF regression. The critical values for the Fisher P-test on a cross
sectionally augmented regression (Pesaran, 2006b) are provided by M. Hashem Pesaran.
11This analysis also employs a normal within groups (WG) approach to
estimating the one-way …xed e¤ects models (country …xed e¤ects included),
as estimated by Abiad and Mody (2005), with nonrobust standard errors
so that how important controlling for error dependence across countries and
overtime is for this contextcan be examined by comparing the WG estimates
and CCEP estimates. The consistency of the one-way WG estimator for the
dynamic homogeneous model is justi…ed by the length of the time series9,
but this estimator is biased in small samples because of the lagged dependent
variable bias. The country …xed e¤ects can be eliminated by an idempotent
(covariance) transformation matrix as in within groups estimation.
3 Empirical evidence
By applying a within groups approach to the Abiad and Mody (2005) frame-
work with the addition of the extent of democracy, this section presents
empirical evidence on what shapes …nancial reform in two steps, an analysis
on the original dataset with the Abiad and Mody (2005) measure in Section
3.1 and an analysis on a larger dataset with the Chinn-Ito (2005) measure
in Section 3.2. In each step, the normal one-way …xed e¤ects WG estimates
with nonrobust standard errors are contrasted with Pesaran (2006a) CCEP
estimates with panel-robust standard errors, with the former assuming that
the errors are serially uncorrelated and independent across countries, while
the latter allowing for error dependence both across countries and over time.
3.1 Analysis on the original dataset
This section concerns the analyses on the benchmark speci…cation (Equation
2) and three alternative speci…cations (Equations 3, 4 and 5) using Abiad
and Mody (2005)’s original dataset. The results are presented in Table
1A/B, Table 2, and Table 3 corresponding to Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9
in Abiad and Mody (2005), respectively.
Table 1A and 1B report the WG estimates and CCEP estimates of the
benchmark speci…cation (Equation 2). Table 1A strictly follows the model
9Since the lagged dependent variable bias arising from the within group transformation
can be alleviated when T is large, for …xed N (Nickell, 1981).
12structure of Abiad and Mody (2005)10 while Table 1B reports FLi;t¡1 and
FL2
i;t¡1 separately, presenting a direct link between policy change, ¢FLit,
and the level of liberalization, FLi;t¡1. In comparison to the ordered logit
estimates in columns 4-6 (with country …xed e¤ects) of Appendix Table 4A,
the WG estimates in Table 1A (country e¤ects are included by de…nition)
not only con…rm their …ndings, but also show that FIRSTY EARit and
OPENit have positive e¤ects on policy change.
Table 1B contains richer information for FLi;t¡1. However, the WG es-
timates suggest a positive e¤ect of FLi;t¡1; possibly leading to instability of
the regression models11. This is perhaps related to the small sample bias of
the one-way within groups estimator, calling for further investigation into
a larger group of countries. The CCEP estimates reported in the columns
4-6 of Table 1B have a much larger R2 than the WG estimates. With satis-
factory …nite sample properties, the CCEP estimates in Table 1B show that
policy change is negatively rather than positively associated with the level
of …nancial liberalization, FLi;t¡1. The e¤ect of the regional liberalization
gap, REG_FLi;t¡1¡FLi;t¡1, has been found to be insigni…cant when more
factors are allowed. The CCEP estimates also predict negative e¤ects on
policy change of crisis, BANKit and HINFLit. However, the CCEP esti-
mates indicate that the Abiad and Mody (2005) …ndings on the e¤ects of
BOPit; IMFit and USINTit are fragile.
Table 2 presents the within groups estimates, WG and CCEP, of the
alternative speci…cations (Equation (3) and Equation (4)) corresponding
to Table 8 in Abiad and Mody (2005). The positive signs of FLi;t¡1 in
columns 1-2 continue to suggest the posibility of unstable models. The
CCEP estimates con…rm the previous observations of Table 1B in terms of
the negative e¤ects of the level of liberalization, banking crisis, and high
in‡ation. The regional liberalization gap appears to be irrelevant once error
dependenece is introduced. Surpringly, the CCEP estimates …nd evidence
for a negative e¤ect of DEMOit on policy change12, implying that the extent
10FLi;t¡1(1 ¡ FLi;t¡1) is reported here.
11Since the derivative of ¢FLit with respect to FLi;t¡1 is likely to be positive, given
the range of FLi;t¡1 from 0 to 1.
12DEMOit appears to negatively associated with policy change with weak signi…cance
in Table 1B.
13of democracy is likely to set reform back.
Next proceed to Table 3 which presents the within groups estimates of
the most general speci…cation (Equation (5)). Note that Appendix Table
4C, the corrected version of Table 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005), shows that
FLi;t¡1, OPENit and OPENit£ FLi;t¡1 are insigni…cant in the presence of
country …xed e¤ects. Similar to column 2 of Appendix Table 4C, the CCEP
estimates of Table 3 …nd less evidence for FLi;t¡1 and REG_FLi;t¡1 ¡
FLi;t¡1: The coe¢cient on REG_FLi;t¡1 ¡ FLi;t¡1 is positive, but the
coe¢cient on the interaction term is negative. This seems to be a more
plausible pattern, suggesting that the regional liberalization gap has a pos-
itive e¤ect on reform when the level of liberalization is low but this e¤ect
declines as the extent of liberalization increases. It provides further strong
evidence for DEMOit and its interaction term with FLi;t¡1, indicating that
the extent of democracy tends to hinder the pace of reform13. The positive
e¤ects of FIRSTYEARit and IMFit, and negative e¤ects of their interac-
tion terms with FLi;t¡1 are observed, highlighting that shocks in the form
of new governments in their …rst year and the IMF programs are likely to
trigger reform, especially when the extent of …nancial liberalization is still
at its early stage.
The discrepancy between WG estimates and CCEP estimates in the
above study has pointed to the fundamental signi…cance of relaxing as-
sumptions on the error term. One may wonder which is more important,
controlling for serial correlation in the errors or adjusting for cross section
error dependence? To what extent does each relaxation make the results
di¤erent from those associated with error independence? Answers may be
found from Appendix Table 5 which reports the WG estimates with panel-
robust standard errors, controlling for serial correlation of errors only, and
the CCEP estimates with nonrobust standard errors, controlling for cross
section error dependence only. As it stands, both are important. Never-
theless, the quantitatively larger e¤ects (coe¢cients) and much larger R2
13The coe¢cient on DEMOit is signi…cantly negative, and although the coe¢cient on
the interaction term is signi…cantly positive, the range of FLi;t¡1 from 0 to 1 determines
the derivative of ¢FLit with respect to DEMOit, ¡0:115 + 0:007 £ FLi;t¡1; is always
negative.
14associated with the CCEP estimates than with the WG estimates may re-
‡ect that controlling for cross country correlation is an especially crucial step
for this context. One may notice from Appendix Table 5 that, suggested by
either the WG estimates or CCEP estimates, the ideology and economic and
political structure in general appear to have a substantial in‡uence on policy
change, especially for LEFTit and OPENit: This has raised a methodologi-
cal concern that insu¢cient consideration of error dependence could lead to
misleading …ndings.
In sum, the above analyses based on the augmented speci…cations in
which DEMOit is included, allowing for the possibility of error dependence
across countries and over time, produce interesting …ndings. On the one
hand, this paper con…rms the signi…cant e¤ects of crises and shocks on
policy reform identi…ed by Abiad and Mody (2005). More speci…cally, it
con…rms negative e¤ects of banking crises and high in‡ation, and does agree
with Abiad and Mody (2005) that a new government in its …rst year and the
IMF program have a strong e¤ect when …nancial sectors are highly repressed
and a weaker e¤ect thereafter. On the other hand, it di¤ers from Abiad and
Mody (2005) in the following three aspects. First, it shows that the sig-
ni…cant e¤ects of balance-of-payment crises and US interest rates found by
Abiad and Mody (2005) are fragile. The second aspect is that it yields oppo-
site …ndings to Abiad and Mody (2005) on the e¤ects of domestic learning.
It shows that the extent of policy reform is negatively rather than positively
a¤ected by the existing liberalization level, while the regional liberalization
gap does not appear relevant. Thirdly, it addresses the importance of the ex-
tent of democracy for the process of …nancial reform and identi…es a negative
e¤ect of the extent of democracy on policy change.
3.2 Analysis on a larger dataset
This section makes an e¤ort to explore if the …ndings are robust to a larger
set of countries. It makes use of the Chinn-Ito index of …nancial openness
(2005) which is available for 108 countries over 1970-2000. But the Chinn-
Ito index only measures a country’s degree of capital account openness, one
aspect of six policy dimensions on which the creation of the Abiad and Mody
15measure (2005) is based. Moreover, the country coverage in this analysis is
con…ned to the data availability of crisis variables taken from Bordo et al.
(2000) which only contains 55 countries. Since most of the added countries
are OECD countries (listed in the Appendix Table 2), the e¤ects of factors
like balance-of-payment crises, banking crises, IMF programs anddemocracy
lecel are expected to be weaker14. A variable description is presented in
Appendix Table 1.
Table 4A, Table 4B and Table 4C report the within groups estimates
corresponding to Table 1B, Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. As expected,
these tables show weaker evidence for the e¤ects of shocks, crises, ideol-
ogy, and economic and political structures on policy reform, except for US
interest rates and high in‡ation. But, since the above analysis in general ob-
tains …ndings consistent with Abiad and Mody (2005) on the e¤ects of crises
and shocks, more emphasis is placed on the robustness of the new …ndings
regarding the negative e¤ects of domestic learning and regional di¤usion.
With a larger sample size, both the WG estimates and CCEP estimates
in these tables clearly indicate that policy reform is negatively linked to
the level of liberalization, FLi;t¡1, at the 1% signi…cance level. The tables
further con…rm that the e¤ect of REG_FLi;t¡1 ¡FLi;t¡1 on policy change
is ambiguous. Removing the variable IMFi;t doesn’t alter the pattern of
the results, as reported in Appendix Table 6.
Hence, the …ndings summarizedearlier on the negative e¤ects of domestic
learning and irrelevance of regional di¤usion are largely supported by a
larger sample of countries based on the Chinn-Ito index of capital account
openness.
4 Discussions
The above …ndings have rich implications. The negative link between pol-
icy change and the liberalization level suggests a convergence in the extent
of …nancial liberalization in the sense that countries with highly repressed
14The panel is unbalanced mainly because data on IMF programs are missing for the
following six countries over period 1973-83: China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria,
Portugal and Uruguay.
16…nancial sectors have more potential to embark on reform, while countries
with a highly liberalized …nancial sector have greater status quo bias - the
reform likelihood is “saturated” (Abiad and Mody, 2005). Vivid examples
can be easily picked up from the …nancial liberalization process in East Asia
in recent decades. Since 1970s, countries or areas with levels of liberaliza-
tion much lower than those of the main developed countries (US or UK
for example) like Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and China have
liberalized their …nancial system actively and progressively.
This research …nds that the signi…cant e¤ect of a regional liberalization
gap on policy changes is hard to identify, although two opposite views have
been proposed in the literature. Abiad and Mody (2005) suggest that coun-
tries with a level of liberalization far from that of the regional leader are
found to be more likely to undertake reform, perhaps due to competitive
pressure. The larger the gap in terms of liberalization levels within a region,
the …ercer the competition among these countries for international capital
and technologies. On the contrary, Axelrod (1997) documents that the more
similar a country is to its neighbouring nations in terms of economic, social
and political developments, the more likely it “adopts one of the neighbour’s
traits” while Simmons and Elkins (2004) predict that “governments’ liber-
alization policies will be in‡uenced by the policies of their most important
foreign economic competitors”. This line of research in general predicts that
a greater gap from the regional leader tends to be associated with less in-
centive to compete and less chance to catch up with the regional leader in
the short-run, therefore a status quo bias is maintained.
In accordance with Abiad and Mody (2005), the pattern suggested by
Table 3, the coe¢cient on REG_FLi;t¡1 ¡ FLi;t¡1 is positive and the co-
e¢cient on the interaction term is negative although insigni…cant, seems to
be in line with the covergence story identi…ed earlier in the sense that coun-
tries with lower levels of liberalization relative to that of the regional leader
are more inclined to initiate reform, while the reform momentum fades as
the liberalization gap from regional leader shrinks. It implies that a greater
gap from the regional leader tends to be associated with more incentives to
engage in reform.
The …nding concerning the negative e¤ect of the extent of democracy on
17policy change is consistent with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), who argue
that there is uncertainty with respect to the distribution of bene…ts and
costs from reform. They contrast democratic societies in which the major-
ity would vote against the reform due to the presence of this uncertainty,
just for safety, with authoritarian societies like Taiwan and South Korea
(early 1960’s) Chile (1970’s), and Turkey (1980’s) where “reform was im-
posed by the authoritarian regimes and against the wishes of business.” The
status quo appears to be more easily dislodged in autocratic societies than
in democratic societies.
This …nding tends to suggest that ideology and political structure can
have a substantial in‡uence on policy change, contrary to some extent to
Abiad and Mody (2005), who claim that ideology and economic and political
structure have a limited in‡uence on policy change. Although the extent of
democracy may exert negative e¤ects in inducing governments to undertake
…nancial reform, democratization is positively associated with changes in
…nancial development as shown in Huang (2005b).
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the forces that stimulate governments to undertake re-
forms to enhance …nancial development, based on Abiad and Mody (2005).
Given the particular nature of the dependent variable, it suggests replacing
the ordered logit technique used by Abiad and Mody (2005) with a within
groups approach, estimating augmented speci…cations in which the extent of
democracy is added to the Abiad and Mody (2005) framework. To re‡ect the
comovement of economic variables in reality driven by unobserved common
factors, this analysis allows for the possibility of error dependence across
countries and over time, which seems of especial importance when studying
the e¤ects of domestic learning and regional di¤usion in the process of …-
nancial liberalization. Based on these innovations, the analysis shows that
some of the Abiad and Mody (2005) …ndings are not robust to error depen-
dence and the estimation method. The analysis stresses the importance of
carefully taking into account the error structure in the econometric analysis
of panel data. It has produced the following signi…cant …ndings, shedding
18new light on the political economy of …nancial reform.
First, the paper is at odds with Abiad and Mody (2005) on the e¤ects of
domestic learning and regional di¤usion. It suggests that policy reform in
a country is negatively rather than positively a¤ected by its level of liberal-
ization, and the liberalization gap from the regional leader is less relevant.
Countries where …nancial sectors are relatively repressed may be those hav-
ing the strongest incentives for reform, and the desire to reform decreases
as the level of …nancial liberalization rises. The regional liberalization gap
doesn’t seem to have a substantial e¤ect on the likelihood of a country to
embark on reform, a possibility discussed in Axelrod (1997), Simmons and
Elkins (2004) and Abiad and Mody (2005).
Second, on the e¤ects of shocks and crises on policy reform, this analysis
supports some of the …ndings identi…ed by Abiad and Mody (2005), but
…nds others to be fragile. More speci…cally, it con…rms the negative e¤ects
of banking crises and high in‡ation. It also agrees with Abiad and Mody
(2005) that new governments in their …rst year and IMF programs have a
strong e¤ect when …nancial sectors are highly repressed and a weaker e¤ect
thereafter. But it …nds no evidence in support of the e¤ects of balance-of-
payment crises and US interest rates on policy change.
Third, this analysis claims that the extent of democracy is also important
for policy change and should be included in the empirical models. The
…nding suggests a negative e¤ect of the extent of democracy on …nancial
reform.
References
[1] Abiad, Abdul and Mody, Ashoka. “Financial Reform: What
Shakes It? What Shapes It?” American Economic Review, 2005, 95,
pp. 66-88.
[2] Arellano, Manuel. “Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within-
Group Estimators,” Oxford Bulletin of Economic and Statistics, 1987,
49, pp. 431-34.
19[3] Axelrod, Robert. “The Dissemination of Culture: A Model with
Local Convergence and Global Polarization”, Journal of Con‡ict Res-
olution, 1997, 41(2), pp. 203-26.
[4] Bordo, Michael; Eichengreen, Barry; Klinge-
biel, Daniela and Martinez-Peria, Maria Soledad.
“Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?”,
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/research/EconomicPolicy.pdf.,
2000.
[5] Bordo, Michael; Eichengreen, Barry; Klingebiel, Daniela and
Martinez-Peria, Maria Soledad. “Financial Crises: Lessons from
the Last 120 Years”, Economic Policy, 2001, April.
[6] Chinn, Menzie D. and Ito, Hiro. “What Matters for Financial
Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions”, NBER
Working Paper No. 11370, 2005.
[7] Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Detragiache, Enrica. “Financial Liber-
alisation and Financial Fragility”, Worldbank Policy Research Working
Paper Series No. 1917, 1998.
[8] Fernandez, Raquel and Rodrik, Dani. “Resistance to Reform:
Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Speci…c Uncertainty”,
American Economic Review, 1991, 81(5), pp. 1146-55.
[9] Heston, Alan; Summers, Robert and Aten, Bettina. Penn world
table version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania (CICUP), 2002, October.
[10] Huang, Yongfu. “What Determines Financial Development?” Bristol
Economics Discussion Papers No. 05/580, 2005a.
[11] Huang, Yongfu. “Will Political Liberalisation Bring about Finan-
cial Development?” Bristol Economics Discussion Papers No. 05/578,
2005b.
[12] IMF. International …nancial statistics (2005).
20[13] Marshall, Monty G. and Jaggers, Keith. Polity IV project country
reports, CIDUM, University of Maryland, 2003.
[14] McKinnon, Ronald I. Money and capital in economic development,
Washington D.C. Brookings Institution, 1973.
[15] Nickel, Stephen J. “Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed E¤ects”,
Econometrica, 1981, 49, pp. 1417-1426.
[16] Pesaran, M. Hashem. “Estimation and Inference in Large Heteroge-
neous Panels with a Multifactor Error Structure”, Econometrica (forth-
coming) 2006a.
[17] Pesaran, M. Hashem. “A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Pres-
ence of Cross Section Dependence”, Cambridge University DAE Work-
ing Paper, No. 0346, 2006b.
[18] Phillips, Peter C. B. and Sul, Donggyu. “Dynamic Panel Testing
and Homogeneity Testing under Cross Section Dependence”, Econo-
metrics Journal, 2003, 6, pp. 217-59.
[19] Quinn, Dennis P. and Inclán, Carla. “The Origins of Financial
Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization”,
American Journal of Political Science, 1997, 41(3), pp. 771-813.
[20] Shaw, Edward S. Financial deepening in economic development, New
York, Oxford University Press, 1973.
[21] Simmons, Beth A. and Elkins, Zachary. “The Globalization of
Liberalization: Policy Di¤usion in the International Political Econ-
omy”, American Political Science Review, 2004, 98(1), pp. 171-89.
[22] Summers, Lawrence H. “International Financial Crises: Causes,
Prevention, and Cures”. American Economic Review Papers and Pro-
ceedings, 2000, 90(2), pp. 1-16.
[23] World Bank. World development indicators (2004).
[24] World Bank. Database of political institutions (2005).
21  Table 1. Within Estimates: Benchmark Specification (Equation 2) 
 
A.  ) 1 ( 1 , 1 , - - - · t i t i FL FL  reported 
 
Estimators  WG  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP  CCEP 
) 1 ( 1 , 1 , - - - · t i t i FL FL   0.083  0.098  0.083  -0.026  -0.011  0.013 
  [0.038]**  [0.038]***  [0.039]**  [0.130]  [0.113]  [0.126] 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.076  0.070  0.083  0.097  0.115  0.173 
  [0.016]***  [0.016]***  [0.017]***  [0.034]***  [0.034]***  [0.052]*** 
it BOP      0.017  0.013    0.013  0.012 
     [0.006]***  [0.006]**    [0.008]*  [0.010] 
it BANK      -0.024  -0.022    -0.028  -0.024 
     [0.007]***  [0.007]***    [0.011]**  [0.012]** 
it RECESSION      -0.010  -0.009    -0.006  -0.009 
     [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010] 
it HINFL      -0.003  -0.002    -0.034  -0.043 
     [0.011]  [0.011]    [0.022]  [0.023]* 
it FIRSTYEAR        0.011      0.010 
       [0.006]*      [0.007] 
it IMF        0.011      0.013 
       [0.007]*      [0.010] 
it USINT        -0.003      -0.004 
       [0.001]***      [0.002]* 
it LEFT        -0.001      -0.020 
       [0.010]      [0.014] 
it RIGHT        0.000      -0.004 
       [0.009]      [0.015] 
it OPEN        0.000      0.001 
       [0.000]*      [0.000] 
it DEMO        -0.013      -0.018 
        [0.014]        [0.029] 
Observations  805  805  805  805  805  805 
Number of country  35  35  35  35  35  35 













B.  1 , - t i FL  and  
2
1 , - t i FL  reported  separately 
 
Estimators  WG  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   0.081  0.096  0.074  -0.204  -0.191  -0.199 
  [0.038]**  [0.038]**  [0.040]*  [0.094]**  [0.091]**  [0.112]* 
2
1 , - t i FL   -0.104  -0.113  -0.113  -0.218  -0.226  -0.250 
  [0.043]**  [0.043]***  [0.043]***  [0.096]**  [0.085]**  [0.105]** 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.059  0.058  0.058  -0.137  -0.113  -0.085 
  [0.022]***  [0.022]***  [0.023]**  [0.032]***  [0.042]**  [0.065] 
it BOP     0.016  0.011    0.007  0.006 
    [0.006]***  [0.006]*    [0.007]  [0.009] 
it BANK     -0.024  -0.020    -0.023  -0.021 
    [0.007]***  [0.007]***    [0.010]**  [0.010]* 
it RECESSION     -0.010  -0.009    -0.002  -0.006 
    [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.008]  [0.010] 
it HINFL     -0.003  -0.002    -0.041  -0.044 
    [0.011]  [0.011]    [0.017]**  [0.019]** 
it FIRSTYEAR       0.011      0.010 
      [0.006]*      [0.007] 
it IMF       0.012      0.014 
      [0.007]*      [0.010] 
it USINT       -0.003      -0.003 
      [0.001]***      [0.003] 
it LEFT       0.002      -0.019 
      [0.010]      [0.012] 
it RIGHT       0.003      -0.001 
      [0.009]      [0.012] 
it OPEN       0.000      0.001 
      [0.000]*      [0.000] 
it DEMO       -0.011      -0.044 
      [0.014]        [0.033] 
Observations  805  805  805  805  805  805 
Number of country  35  35  35  35  35.00  35 
R-squared  0.03  0.05  0.08  0.31  0.33  0.40 
 
Note: 35 countries (original dataset), 1973-1997. Dependent variable is D t i FL , . Using normal one-way 
within groups estimator (WG) and Pesaran (2006a)’s CCEP estimator, Table A/B presents new results 
corresponding to Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005) with the addition of 
it DEMO . Table 2A reports 
within groups estimates for  ) 1 ( 1 , 1 , - - - · t i t i FL FL , while Table 2B reports results for  1 , - t i FL  and 
2
1 , - t i FL  reported separately.  The within groups R-squared is reported.  Nonrobust standard errors are 
reported for WG estimates, while panel- robust standard errors are reported for CCEP estimates. * 





Table 2. Within Estimates: Alternative Specification (Equation 3 and 4) 
 
Estimators  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   0.074  0.092  -0.199  -0.392 
  [0.040]*  [0.040]**  [0.112]*  [0.106]*** 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   -0.113  -0.201  -0.25  -0.235 
  [0.043]***  [0.053]***  [0.105]**  [0.138]* 
1 , 1 , - - · t i t i Y FL     0.007    0.016 
    [0.002]***    [0.010] 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.058  0.063  -0.085  0.062 
  [0.023]**  [0.023]***  [0.065]  [0.091] 
it BOP   0.011  0.011  0.006  -0.005 
  [0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.009]  [0.010] 
it BANK   -0.020  -0.022  -0.021  -0.022 
  [0.007]***  [0.007]***  [0.010]*  [0.011]** 
it RECESSION   -0.009  -0.008  -0.006  -0.012 
  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.010]  [0.010] 
it HINFL   -0.002  -0.005  -0.044  -0.017 
  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.019]**  [0.028] 
it FIRSTYEAR   0.011  0.011  0.01  0.008 
  [0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.007]  [0.007] 
it IMF   0.012  0.012  0.014  0.012 
  [0.007]*  [0.007]*  [0.010]  [0.010] 
it USINT   -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.001 
  [0.001]***  [0.001]***  [0.003]  [0.002] 
it LEFT   0.002  0.000  -0.019  -0.019 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.016] 
it RIGHT   0.003  0.003  -0.001  -0.018 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.012]  [0.017] 
it OPEN   0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001 
  [0.000]*  [0.000]**  [0.000]  [0.001] 
it DEMO   -0.011  -0.010  -0.044  -0.089 
  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.033]  [0.049]* 
Observations  805  805  805  805 
Number of country  35  35  35  35 
R-squared  0.08  0.09  0.4  0.55 
 
Note: This table, based on the original dataset, presents new results corresponding to the Table 8 in 
Abiad and Mody (2005) with the addition of






 Table 3. Within Estimates: Alternative Specification (Equation 5) 
 
Estimators  WG  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   -0.009  -0.045 
  [0.072]  [0.315] 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   -0.011  -0.344 
  [0.073]  [0.229] 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.025  0.054 
  [0.023]  [0.098] 
1 , 1 , 1 , ) _ ( - - - · - t i t i t i FL FL FL REG   0.330  -0.098 
  [0.086]***  [0.300] 
it BOP   0.020  0.004 
  [0.010]**  [0.014] 
1 , - · t i it FL BOP   -0.029  -0.029 
  [0.019]  [0.028] 
it BANK   -0.023  -0.01 
  [0.013]*  [0.017] 
1 , - · t i it FL BANK   0.004  -0.035 
  [0.027]  [0.033] 
it RECESSION   -0.015  -0.015 
  [0.012]  [0.017] 
1 , - · t i it FL RECESSION   0.020  0.007 
  [0.023]  [0.028] 
it HINFL   0.030  0.007 
  [0.015]*  [0.033] 
1 , - · t i it FL HINFL   -0.156  -0.117 
  [0.043]***  [0.091] 
it FIRSTYEAR   0.028  0.031 
  [0.010]***  [0.015]** 
1 , - · t i it FL FIRSTYEAR   -0.049  -0.064 
  [0.020]**  [0.027]** 
it IMF   0.020  0.023 
  [0.009]**  [0.012]* 
1 , - · t i it FL IMF   -0.050  -0.069 
  [0.026]*  [0.030]** 
it USINT   -0.003  -0.001 
  [0.001]***  [0.002] 
it LEFT   -0.025  -0.034 
  [0.014]*  [0.023] 
1 , - · t i it FL LEFT   0.068  0.024 
  [0.034]**  [0.039] 
it RIGHT   0.006  -0.012 
  [0.012]  [0.020] 
1 , - · t i it FL RIGHT   0.020  -0.03 
  [0.032]  [0.050] 
it OPEN   0.001  0.002 
  [0.000]***  [0.001] 
1 , - · t i it FL OPEN   -0.001  -0.002 
  [0.000]***  [0.001] 
it DEMO   -0.030  -0.115 
  [0.018]*  [0.047]** 
1 , - · t i it FL DEMO   0.002  0.007 
  [0.002]  [0.004]* 
Observations  805  805 
Number of country  35  35 
R-squared  0.14  0.57 
Note: This table, based on the original dataset, presents new results corresponding to the Table 9 in 
Abiad and Mody (2005) with the addition of
it DEMO .  See Table 1 for further notes. 
 Table 4. Augmented dataset with Chinn-Ito measure (2005) 
 
A.  Within estimates corresponding to Table 1B 
Estimators  WG  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   -0.168  -0.170  -0.185  -0.204  -0.214  -0.301 
  [0.044]***  [0.044]***  [0.048]***  [0.069]***  [0.068]***  [0.086]*** 
2
1 , - t i FL   0.052  0.053  0.070  0.087  0.092  0.164 
  [0.037]  [0.037]  [0.039]*  [0.049]*  [0.049]*  [0.058]*** 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   -0.016  -0.018  0.007  0.048  0.044  0.063 
  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.030]  [0.036]  [0.037]  [0.046] 
it BOP      0.002  0.003    -0.005  -0.006 
     [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.007]  [0.008] 
it BANK      -0.010  -0.012    -0.008  -0.010 
     [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.010]  [0.011] 
it RECESSION      -0.001  0.004    0.001  0.002 
     [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.008]  [0.009] 
it HINFL      -0.018  -0.015    -0.009  -0.007 
     [0.012]  [0.013]    [0.017]  [0.018] 
it FIRSTYEAR        0.000      0.001 
       [0.007]      [0.005] 
it IMF        0.000      0.007 
       [0.009]      [0.007] 
it USINT        -0.005      -0.002 
       [0.001]***      [0.002] 
it LEFT        -0.002      -0.010 
       [0.010]      [0.010] 
it RIGHT        0.000      -0.003 
       [0.010]      [0.012] 
it OPEN        0.000      0.000 
       [0.000]      [0.000] 
it DEMO        -0.003      0.004 
        [0.018]      [0.027] 
Observations  1263  1262  1150  1263  1262  1150 
Number of country  55  55  53  55  55  53 
R-squared  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.22  0.22  0.26 
 
Note: 55 countries, 1973-1997. Dependent variable is D t i FL , . Using normal one-way within groups 
estimator (WG) and Pesaran (2006a)’s CCEP estimator, this table, based on a larger dataset associated 
with the Chinn-Ito measure (2005), presents new results corresponding to the Table 1B.  The within 
groups R-squared is reported.  Variable descriptions are presented in the Appendix Table 1. Countries 
included are listed in the Appendix Table 2.  Nonrobust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, 
while panel- robust standard errors are reported for CCEP estimates. * significant at 10%; ** significant 








 B.  Within estimates corresponding to Table 2 
 
Estimators  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   -0.185  -0.180  -0.301  -0.375 
  [0.048]***  [0.048]***  [0.086]***  [0.122]*** 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   0.070  0.028  0.164  0.138 
  [0.039]*  [0.046]  [0.058]***  [0.071]* 
1 , 1 , - - · t i t i Y FL     0.003    0.002 
    [0.002]*    [0.004] 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.007  0.013  0.063  0.038 
  [0.030]  [0.030]  [0.046]  [0.058] 
it BOP   0.003  0.002  -0.006  -0.012 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.010] 
it BANK   -0.012  -0.011  -0.010  -0.002 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.013] 
it RECESSION   0.004  0.005  0.002  0.002 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.010] 
it HINFL   -0.015  -0.018  -0.007  0.006 
  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.018]  [0.017] 
it FIRSTYEAR   0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.005]  [0.006] 
it IMF   0.000  0.000  0.007  0.010 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
it USINT   -0.005  -0.005  -0.002  -0.002 
  [0.001]***  [0.001]***  [0.002]  [0.002] 
it LEFT   -0.002  -0.004  -0.010  -0.013 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.011] 
it RIGHT   0.000  -0.002  -0.003  -0.008 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.017] 
it OPEN   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001] 
it DEMO   -0.003  -0.003  0.004  0.007 
  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.027]  [0.033] 
Observations  1150  1150  1150  1150 
Number of country  53  53  53  53 
R-squared  0.07  0.07  0.26  0.33 
 









 C.  Within estimates corresponding to Table 3 
Estimators  WG  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   -0.360  -0.681 
  [0.096]***  [0.255]** 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   0.255  0.448 
  [0.089]***  [0.232]* 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   -0.006  -0.009 
  [0.031]  [0.057] 
1 , 1 , 1 , ) _ ( - - - · - t i t i t i FL FL FL REG   0.274  0.436 
  [0.107]**  [0.263] 
it BOP   -0.010  -0.013 
  [0.012]  [0.017] 
1 , - · t i it FL BOP   0.030  0.009 
  [0.020]  [0.028] 
it BANK   -0.010  -0.002 
  [0.014]  [0.024] 
1 , - · t i it FL BANK   0.003  -0.002 
  [0.025]  [0.036] 
it RECESSION   0.006  0.003 
  [0.011]  [0.012] 
1 , - · t i it FL RECESSION   -0.008  -0.006 
  [0.021]  [0.019] 
it HINFL   0.041  0.046 
  [0.018]**  [0.033] 
1 , - · t i it FL HINFL   -0.254  -0.171 
  [0.054]***  [0.147] 
it FIRSTYEAR   -0.008  -0.009 
  [0.011]  [0.009] 
1 , - · t i it FL FIRSTYEAR   0.019  0.019 
  [0.021]  [0.017] 
it IMF   -0.002  0.018 
  [0.011]  [0.012] 
1 , - · t i it FL IMF   0.032  -0.006 
  [0.039]  [0.050] 
it USINT   -0.005  -0.003 
  [0.001]***  [0.002] 
it LEFT   -0.019  -0.045 
  [0.016]  [0.028] 
1 , - · t i it FL LEFT   0.028  0.068 
  [0.031]  [0.051] 
it RIGHT   0.004  -0.015 
  [0.015]  [0.031] 
1 , - · t i it FL RIGHT   -0.011  0.022 
  [0.031]  [0.048] 
it OPEN   0.001  0.000 
  [0.000]*  [0.001] 
1 , - · t i it FL OPEN   0.000  0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
it DEMO   -0.010  0.008 
  [0.020]  [0.041] 
1 , - · t i it FL DEMO   0.001  0.000 
  [0.002]  [0.007] 
Observations  1150  1150 
Number of country  53  53 
R-squared  0.10  0.35 
Note:  See Table 4A for further notes. Appendix Table 1. The Variables (mainly used with the larger dataset) 
     
VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION  SOURCE 
  FL  It is the financial liberalisation index, produced by rescaling the 
Chinn-Ito index to interval [0, 1]. The Chinn-Ito index, the 
KAOPEN index, is to measure a country's degree of capital 
account openness, taking on higher values the more open the 
country is to cross-border capital transactions.  
Chinn and Ito (2005) 
  Y  GDP per capita in PPP terms.  Penn World Table 6.1 
  BOP  As in Abiad and Mody (2005) (originally taken from Bordo et al. 
(2000)), it is the balance-of-payment crisis variable identified by 
"a forced change in parity, abandonment of a pegged exchange 
rate, or an international rescue," or if an index of exchange 
market pressure (a weighted average of exchange rate, reserve, 
and interest rate changes) exceeds a critical threshold of one 
and a half standard deviations above its mean. It is set equal to 
1 if a balance of payment crisis has occurred within the past two 
years, and 0 otherwise. 
Bordo et al. (2000) 
  BANK  As in Abiad and Mody (2005) (originally taken from Bordo et al. 
(2000)), it is the bankig crisis identified by periods of "financial 
distress resulting in the erosion of most or all of aggregate 
banking system capital".  It is set equal to 1 if a banking crisis 
has occurred within the past two years, and 0 otherwise. 
Bordo et al. (2000) 
  RECESSION  As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the recession dummy 
variable, set equal to 1 where the annual real GDP growth rate 
is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
Penn World Table 6.1 
(PWT61) (Heston et al., 
2002) 
  HINFL  As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the high inflation dummy 
variable, set equal to 1 where the annual inflation exceeds 50%, 
and 0 otherwise. 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI), 2004 
  FIRSTYEAR  Based on the YRSOFFCA vaiable, it is the first year in office 
dummy as in Abiad and Mody (2005). 
World Bank's Database of 
Political Institutions (2005) 
  IMF  As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the IMF program dummy 
variable constructed using the program dates from the IMF 
"History of Lending Arrangements". 
Abiad and Mody (2005), 
and IMF's "History of 
Lending".  
  USINST  As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it is the U. S. Treasury Bill rate 
used as the world interest rate. 
IMF's International 
Financial Statistics (2005) 
  LEFT  As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it denotes the left-wing 
government where its associated party is named or described as 
"communist", "socialist", "Social Democratic", or "left-wing". 
World Bank's Database of 
Political Institutions (2005) 
  RIGHT  As in Abiad and Mody (2005), it denotes the left-wing 
government where its associated party is named or described as 
"conservative", or "right-wing". 
World Bank's Database of 
Political Institutions (2005) 
  OPEN  The sum of exports and imports over GDP (at current prices), 
averaged over 1973-97.  
Penn World Table 6.1 
  DEMO  Index of democracy. It is called combined polity score, the 
democracy score minus the autocracy score, averaged over 
1973-97. It is also used with the original dataset. The index has 
been converted to range from 0 to 1. 
PolityIV Database 
(Marshall et al., 2003)  
  
Appendix Table 2: The list of countries in the augmented dataset   
                        
East Asia       South Asia    OECD countries   
CHN  China    BGD  Bangladesh*  AUS  Australia* 
HKG  Hong Kong  IND  India*    AUT  Austria   
IDN  Indonesia*  LKA  Sri Lanka*  BEL  Belgium   
KOR  Korea, Republic of*NPL  Nepal*    CAN  Canada*   
MYS  Malaysia*    PAK  Pakistan*    CHE  Switzerland 
PHL  Philippines*        DEU  Germany*   
SGP  Singapore*        DNK  Denmark   
THA  Thailand*          ESP  Spain   
TWN  Taiwan*          FIN  Finland   
            FRA  France*   
Latin America & Caribbean  Middle East & Africa  GBR  United Kingdom* 
ARG  Argentina*  EGY  Egypt*    GRC  Greece   
BRA  Brazil*    GHA  Ghana*    IRL  Ireland   
CHL  Chile*    ISR  Israel*    ISL  Iceland   
COL  Colombia*  MAR  Morocco*    ITA  Italy*   
CRI  Costa Rica  NGA  Nigeria    JPN  Japan*   
ECU  Ecuador    ZAF  South Africa*  NLD  Netherlands 
JAM  Jamaica    ZWE  Zimbabwe*  NOR  Norway   
MEX  Mexico*          NZL  New Zealand* 
PER  Peru*          PRT  Portugal   
PRY  Paraguay          SWE  Sweden   
URY  Uruguay          TUR  Turkey*   
VEN  Venezuela*          USA  USA*    
                 




Appendix Table 3. Unit Root Test in Heterogeneous Panels     
              
Variables                  FL                     GDP              OPEN 
Trend  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Maddala and Wu (1999)'s Fisher test  43.82  25.39  77.84  52.81  75.23  64.11 
   [0.99]  [1.00]  [0.24]  [0.94]  [0.31]  [0.68] 
Pesaran (2006b)'s cross sectionally                 
augmented Fisher test  74.85  50.23  67.65  54.98  63.01  62.31 
             
Note: Maddala and Wu (1999)’s Fisher test is for the case of cross sectionally independent error. Under 
the null of a unit root, the test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. Pesaran (2006b)’s 
test is the  Maddala and Wu (1999)’s Fisher test applied to the cross sectionally augmented Dickey- 
Fuller regression. The 10% critical values provided by H.M. Pesaran for the pair of N=30 and T=30 is  




Appendix Table 4. Corrected version of Tables 7, 8 and 9 in Abiad and 
Mody (2005) 
 
A. Corrected version of Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005) 
Country dummy included  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
) 1 ( 1 , 1 , - - - · t i t i FL FL   3.933  4.562  4.106  6.794  7.284  6.574 
  [4.39]***  [4.94]***  [4.48]***  [4.44]***  [4.83]***  [4.07]*** 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   1.032  1.050  1.195  2.285  2.089  2.529 
  [4.18]***  [3.76]***  [3.93]***  [3.23]***  [2.71]***  [3.21]*** 
it BOP     0.521  0.430    0.550  0.475 
    [2.60]***  [2.21]**    [2.19]**  [1.94]* 
it BANK     -1.020  -0.983    -0.995  -0.935 
    [2.74]***  [2.67]***    [2.68]***  [2.57]** 
it RECESSION     -0.018  0.002    -0.055  -0.026 
    [0.05]  [0.00]    [0.15]  [0.07] 
it HINFL     -0.136  -0.238    -0.317  -0.302 
    [0.35]  [0.62]    [0.50]  [0.48] 
it FIRSTYEAR       0.178      0.234 
      [0.78]      [0.87] 
it IMF       0.327      0.253 
      [1.81]*      [0.98] 
it USINT       -0.071      -0.090 
      [1.82]*      [2.13]** 
it LEFT       0.282      -0.035 
      [1.14]      [0.10] 
it RIGHT       0.153      -0.132 
      [0.85]      [0.39] 
it OPEN       -0.001      0.009 
      [1.01]      [1.14] 
Observations  805  805  805  805  805  805 
Number of country  35  35  35  35  35  35 
 
Note: This is a corrected version of Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005) that treats Singapore as an African 
country and South Africa as an East Asian country.  Except for the difference in magnitude, this table 
shows a similar pattern to the Table 7 in Abiad and Mody (2005).  Robust t statistics in brackets. * 













 B. Corrected version of Table 8 in Abiad and Mody (2005) 
 
Country dummy included  No  No  Yes  Yes 
1 , - t i FL   4.110  4.307  6.546  7.189 
  [4.49]***  [4.69]***  [4.02]***  [4.34]*** 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   -4.052  -5.720  -6.638  -9.893 
  [3.94]***  [4.19]***  [3.35]***  [3.90]*** 
1 , 1 , - - · t i t i Y FL     0.095    0.247 
    [2.34]**    [2.55]** 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   1.231  0.965  2.465  2.714 
  [2.72]***  [1.88]*  [2.09]**  [2.45]** 
it BOP   0.429  0.476  0.473  0.457 
  [2.19]**  [2.40]**  [2.02]**  [1.95]* 
it BANK   -0.985  -0.976  -0.932  -1.007 
  [2.70]***  [2.70]***  [2.70]***  [2.92]*** 
it RECESSION   -0.002  -0.005  -0.027  0.001 
  [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.07]  [0.00] 
it HINFL   -0.235  -0.206  -0.303  -0.398 
  [0.63]  [0.53]  [0.48]  [0.64] 
it FIRSTYEAR   0.178  0.141  0.233  0.245 
  [0.78]  [0.62]  [0.86]  [0.91] 
it IMF   0.332  0.414  0.255  0.288 
  [1.74]*  [2.12]**  [0.96]  [1.06] 
it USINT   -0.070  -0.074  -0.090  -0.086 
  [1.80]*  [1.87]*  [2.07]**  [1.99]** 
it LEFT   0.280  0.190  -0.029  -0.098 
  [1.15]  [0.82]  [0.08]  [0.28] 
it RIGHT   0.146  0.153  -0.125  -0.072 
  [0.77]  [0.84]  [0.38]  [0.21] 
it OPEN   -0.001  0.000  0.009  0.013 
  [1.00]  [0.04]  [1.14]  [1.40] 
Observations  805  805  805  805 
Number of country  35  35  35  35 
 
Note: This table corresponds to the Table 8 in Abiad and Mody (2005) that treats Singapore as an 
African country and South Africa as an East Asian country, and consequently indicates that IMF in 
column 1 and REG_FL-FL in column 2 and 3 are insignificant.  Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant 










 C. Corrected version of Table 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005) 
Country dummy included  No  Yes 
1 , - t i FL   3.719  3.475 
  [2.16]**  [1.61] 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   -3.827  -1.82 
  [2.19]**  [0.70] 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.508  1.459 
  [0.81]  [1.21] 
1 , 1 , 1 , ) _ ( - - - · - t i t i t i FL FL FL REG  
2.87  10.256 
  [1.51]  [3.95]*** 
it BOP   0.811  0.809 
  [2.69]***  [1.89]* 
1 , - · t i it FL BOP   -0.892  -0.989 
  [1.47]  [1.11] 
it BANK   -0.883  -1.043 
  [1.65]*  [1.85]* 
1 , - · t i it FL BANK  
-0.093  0.016 
  [0.09]  [0.01] 
it RECESSION   -0.487  -0.503 
  [1.12]  [0.91] 
1 , - · t i it FL RECESSION  
1.235  1.164 
  [1.43]  [1.21] 
it HINFL   0.292  0.37 
  [0.64]  [0.50] 
1 , - · t i it FL HINFL  
-2.203  -3.471 
  [1.65]*  [2.35]** 
it FIRSTYEAR   0.566  0.592 
  [1.98]**  [1.86]* 
1 , - · t i it FL FIRSTYEAR  
-1.163  -1.055 
  [1.84]*  [1.45] 
it IMF   0.775  0.65 
  [2.94]***  [1.83]* 
1 , - · t i it FL IMF  
-1.523  -1.741 
  [2.26]**  [1.94]* 
it USINT   -0.078  -0.091 
  [1.93]*  [2.10]** 
it LEFT   -0.116  -0.616 
  [0.29]  [1.16] 
1 , - · t i it FL LEFT   1.049  1.282 
  [1.01]  [1.09] 
it RIGHT   0.257  0.192 
  [0.87]  [0.50] 
1 , - · t i it FL RIGHT   0.087  -0.221 
  [0.09]  [0.19] 
it OPEN   3.719  3.475 
  [2.16]**  [1.61] 
1 , - · t i it FL OPEN   -3.827  -1.82 
  [2.19]**  [0.70] 
Observations  805  805 
Number of country  35  35 
Note: This table corresponds to the Table 9 in Abiad and Mody (2005) that treats Singapore as an 
African country and South Africa as an East Asian country, and consequently indicates that (REG_FL-
FL) ·FL is significant but OPEN and OPEN·FL are insignificant in column 1, and FL, OPEN and 
OPEN·FL are significant in column 2.  Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Appendix Table 5. Error dependence across countries and over time 
considered separately 
 
A. Within estimates corresponding to Table 1B 
Estimators  WG  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   0.081  0.096  0.074  -0.204  -0.191  -0.199 
  [0.050]  [0.046]**  [0.054]  [0.063]***  [0.063]***  [0.070]*** 
2
1 , - t i FL   -0.104  -0.113  -0.113  -0.218  -0.226  -0.250 
  [0.047]**  [0.046]**  [0.052]**  [0.065]***  [0.065]***  [0.071]*** 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.059  0.058  0.058  -0.137  -0.113  -0.085 
  [0.025]**  [0.028]**  [0.027]**  [0.033]***  [0.033]***  [0.038]** 
it BOP     0.016  0.011    0.007  0.006 
    [0.006]**  [0.006]*    [0.006]  [0.007] 
it BANK     -0.024  -0.020    -0.023  -0.021 
    [0.010]**  [0.009]**    [0.007]***  [0.007]*** 
it RECESSION     -0.010  -0.009    -0.002  -0.006 
    [0.010]  [0.010]    [0.007]  [0.007] 
it HINFL     -0.003  -0.002    -0.041  -0.044 
    [0.020]  [0.020]    [0.011]***  [0.012]*** 
it FIRSTYEAR       0.011      0.010 
      [0.006]*      [0.006]* 
it IMF       0.012      0.014 
      [0.009]      [0.007]** 
it USINT       -0.003      -0.003 
      [0.001]**      [0.001]** 
it LEFT       0.002      -0.019 
      [0.008]      [0.010]* 
it RIGHT       0.003      -0.001 
      [0.008]      [0.010] 
it OPEN       0.000      0.001 
      [0.000]*      [0.000]* 
it DEMO       -0.011      -0.044 
        [0.013]        [0.020]** 
Observations  805  805  805  805  805  805 
Number of country  35  35  35  35  35.00  35 
R-squared  0.03  0.05  0.08  0.31  0.33  0.40 
 
Note: Panel-robust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, while nonrobust standard errors are 













B. Within estimates corresponding to Table 2 
 
Estimators  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   0.074  0.092  -0.199  -0.392 
  [0.054]  [0.054]*  [0.070]***  [0.091]*** 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   -0.113  -0.201  -0.250  -0.235 
  [0.052]**  [0.069]***  [0.071]***  [0.107]** 
1 , 1 , - - · t i t i Y FL     0.007    0.016 
    [0.003]**    [0.008]* 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.058  0.063  -0.085  0.062 
  [0.027]**  [0.025]**  [0.038]**  [0.043] 
it BOP   0.011  0.011  0.006  -0.005 
  [0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.007]  [0.007] 
it BANK   -0.02  -0.022  -0.021  -0.022 
  [0.009]**  [0.009]**  [0.007]***  [0.008]*** 
it RECESSION   -0.009  -0.008  -0.006  -0.012 
  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
it HINFL   -0.002  -0.005  -0.044  -0.017 
  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.012]***  [0.015] 
it FIRSTYEAR   0.011  0.011  0.010  0.008 
  [0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.006]*  [0.006] 
it IMF   0.012  0.012  0.014  0.012 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.007]**  [0.007]* 
it USINT   -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.001 
  [0.001]**  [0.001]**  [0.001]**  [0.002] 
it LEFT   0.002  0  -0.019  -0.019 
  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.010]*  [0.011]* 
it RIGHT   0.003  0.003  -0.001  -0.018 
  [0.008]  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.011]* 
it OPEN   0  0  0.001  0.001 
  [0.000]*  [0.000]*  [0.000]*  [0.000]* 
it DEMO   -0.011  -0.01  -0.044  -0.089 
  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.020]**  [0.024]*** 
Observations  805  805  805  805 
Number of country  35  35  35  35 
R-squared  0.08  0.09  0.40  0.55 
 
Note:  Panel-robust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, while nonrobust standard errors are 





C. Within estimates corresponding to Table 3 
 
Estimators  WG  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   -0.009  -0.045 
  [0.062]  [0.143] 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   -0.011  -0.344 
  [0.070]  [0.142]** 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.025  0.054 
  [0.029]  [0.045] 
1 , 1 , 1 , ) _ ( - - - · - t i t i t i FL FL FL REG   0.330  -0.098 
  [0.084]***  [0.152] 
it BOP   0.020  0.004 
  [0.010]*  [0.011] 
1 , - · t i it FL BOP   -0.029  -0.029 
  [0.021]  [0.022] 
it BANK   -0.023  -0.010 
  [0.017]  [0.014] 
1 , - · t i it FL BANK   0.004  -0.035 
  [0.026]  [0.029] 
it RECESSION   -0.015  -0.015 
  [0.016]  [0.011] 
1 , - · t i it FL RECESSION   0.020  0.007 
  [0.022]  [0.022] 
it HINFL   0.030  0.007 
  [0.027]  [0.019] 
1 , - · t i it FL HINFL   -0.156  -0.117 
  [0.059]**  [0.058]** 
it FIRSTYEAR   0.028  0.031 
  [0.010]**  [0.009]*** 
1 , - · t i it FL FIRSTYEAR   -0.049  -0.064 
  [0.024]*  [0.019]*** 
it IMF   0.020  0.023 
  [0.011]*  [0.010]** 
1 , - · t i it FL IMF   -0.050  -0.069 
  [0.022]**  [0.033]** 
it USINT   -0.003  -0.001 
  [0.001]**  [0.002] 
it LEFT   -0.025  -0.034 
  [0.015]  [0.016]** 
1 , - · t i it FL LEFT   0.068  0.024 
  [0.038]*  [0.038] 
it RIGHT   0.006  -0.012 
  [0.011]  [0.015] 
1 , - · t i it FL RIGHT   0.020  -0.030 
  [0.034]  [0.042] 
it OPEN   0.001  0.002 
  [0.000]**  [0.001]*** 
1 , - · t i it FL OPEN   -0.001  -0.002 
  [0.000]**  [0.001]** 
it DEMO   -0.030  -0.115 
  [0.026]  [0.028]*** 
1 , - · t i it FL DEMO   0.002  0.007 
  [0.002]  [0.004]* 
Observations  805  805 
Number of country  35  35 
R-squared  0.14  0.57 
Note:  Panel-robust standard errors are reported for WG estimates, while nonrobust standard errors are 
reported for CCEP estimates.  See Table 1 for further notes.  
Appendix Table 6. Augmented dataset with Chinn-Ito measure (2005): IMF dropped 
 
A.  Within estimates corresponding to Table 1B 
Estimators  WG  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   -0.168  -0.170  -0.174  -0.204  -0.214  -0.261 
  [0.044]***  [0.044]***  [0.045]***  [0.069]***  [0.068]***  [0.084]*** 
2
1 , - t i FL   0.052  0.053  0.056  0.087  0.092  0.119 
  [0.037]  [0.037]  [0.038]  [0.049]*  [0.049]*  [0.059]** 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   -0.016  -0.018  0.002  0.048  0.044  0.044 
  [0.027]  [0.027]  [0.028]  [0.036]  [0.037]  [0.036] 
it BOP     0.002  0.001    -0.005  -0.006 
    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.007]  [0.008] 
it BANK     -0.010  -0.010    -0.008  -0.009 
    [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.010]  [0.011] 
it RECESSION     -0.001  0.000    0.001  0.001 
    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.008]  [0.009] 
it HINFL     -0.018  -0.017    -0.009  -0.009 
    [0.012]  [0.013]    [0.017]  [0.017] 
it FIRSTYEAR       0.000      0.001 
      [0.007]      [0.006] 
it USINT       -0.005      -0.002 
      [0.001]***      [0.002] 
it LEFT       -0.004      -0.008 
      [0.010]      [0.009] 
it RIGHT       0.000      0.000 
      [0.010]      [0.011] 
it OPEN       0.000      0.000 
      [0.000]*      [0.000] 
it DEMO       -0.002      0.012 
      [0.016]      [0.022] 
Observations  1263  1262  1213  1263  1262  1213 
Number of country  55  55  53  55  55  53 
R-squared  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.22  0.22  0.25 
 
















B.  Within estimates corresponding to Table 2 
 
Estimators  WG  WG  CCEP  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   -0.174  -0.169  -0.261  -0.343 
  [0.045]***  [0.045]***  [0.084]***  [0.118]*** 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   0.056  0.006  0.119  0.079 
  [0.038]  [0.044]  [0.059]**  [0.081] 
1 , 1 , - - · t i t i Y FL     0.004    0.004 
    [0.002]**    [0.004] 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   0.002  0.007  0.044  0.012 
  [0.028]  [0.028]  [0.036]  [0.048] 
it BOP   0.001  0.001  -0.006  -0.011 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.009] 
it BANK   -0.010  -0.010  -0.009  0.000 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.013] 
it RECESSION   0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
it HINFL   -0.017  -0.020  -0.009  0.000 
  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.017]  [0.016] 
it FIRSTYEAR   0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000 
  [0.007]  [0.007]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
it USINT   -0.005  -0.004  -0.002  -0.001 
  [0.001]***  [0.001]***  [0.002]  [0.002] 
it LEFT   -0.004  -0.006  -0.008  -0.012 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.010] 
it RIGHT   0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.004 
  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.015] 
it OPEN   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  [0.000]*  [0.000]*  [0.000]  [0.000] 
it DEMO   -0.002  -0.002  0.012  0.019 
  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.022]  [0.028] 
Observations  1213  1213  1213  1213 
Number of country  53  53  53  53 
R-squared  0.07  0.07  0.25  0.31 













 C.  Within estimates corresponding to Table 3 
Estimators  WG  CCEP 
1 , - t i FL   -0.303  -0.599 
  [0.089]***  [0.232]** 
2
1 , ) ( - t i FL   0.190  0.355 
  [0.081]**  [0.208]* 
1 , 1 , _ - - - t i t i FL FL REG   -0.024  -0.040 
  [0.029]  [0.053] 
1 , 1 , 1 , ) _ ( - - - · - t i t i t i FL FL FL REG   0.216  0.360 
  [0.096]**  [0.224] 
it BOP   -0.010  -0.010 
  [0.011]  [0.015] 
1 , - · t i it FL BOP   0.027  0.000 
  [0.020]  [0.025] 
it BANK   -0.008  0.002 
  [0.014]  [0.023] 
1 , - · t i it FL BANK   -0.003  -0.009 
  [0.025]  [0.035] 
it RECESSION   0.006  0.009 
  [0.010]  [0.011] 
1 , - · t i it FL RECESSION   -0.017  -0.023 
  [0.020]  [0.022] 
it HINFL   0.027  0.022 
  [0.017]  [0.031] 
1 , - · t i it FL HINFL   -0.201  -0.103 
  [0.049]***  [0.143] 
it FIRSTYEAR   -0.005  -0.005 
  [0.011]  [0.009] 
1 , - · t i it FL FIRSTYEAR   0.010  0.010 
  [0.020]  [0.018] 
it USINT   -0.005  -0.002 
  [0.001]***  [0.002] 
it LEFT   -0.017  -0.034 
  [0.015]  [0.025] 
1 , - · t i it FL LEFT   0.022  0.048 
  [0.030]  [0.049] 
it RIGHT   0.009  -0.004 
  [0.014]  [0.025] 
1 , - · t i it FL RIGHT   -0.019  0.006 
  [0.030]  [0.043] 
it OPEN   0.001  0.000 
  [0.000]**  [0.000] 
1 , - · t i it FL OPEN   0.000  0.000 
  [0.000]  [0.000] 
it DEMO   -0.002  0.020 
  [0.019]  [0.033] 
1 , - · t i it FL DEMO   0.002  0.002 
  [0.002]  [0.005] 
Observations  1213  1213 
Number of country  53  53 
R-squared  0.09  0.33 
Note:  See Table 4A for notes.  